Many aspects of social welfare are intrinsically multidimensional. Composite indices attempting to reduce this complexity to a unique measure abound in many areas of economics and public policy. Comparisons based on such measures depend, sometimes critically, on how the different dimensions of performance are weighted. Thus, a policy maker maker may wish to take into account imprecision over composite index weights in a systematic manner.
given weight imprecision.
My paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, I adopt the -contamination setting of Foster et al. [11] 3 , and use results from polyhedral geometry (Lawrence [17] ) to efficiently compute the results of pairwise comparisons between alternatives. That is, given two alternatives a 1 and a 2 and a set of weights adhering to the parametric structure ofcontamination, I adapt the insights of Lawrence [17] to present a closed-form formula for the proportion of those weights ranking a 1 above a 2 and vice-versa. Moreover, I am able to prove that these proportions are monotonic in , the magnitude of weight imprecision. I implement Lawrence's formula computationally in the context of the applied exercises of Section 5.
The second contribution of the paper is to use the theory of social choice to propose a "good" compromise ranking of the alternatives given weight imprecision. Viewing each vector of weights as a "voter" who expresses his/her preferences over alternatives via the composite score, the previous polyhedral analysis provides the results for all pairwise contests between alternatives over an "electorate" of weights defined by the -contamination structure. With this interpretation in mind, I propose the Kemeny aggregation procedure (Kemeny [14] ) as a way of computing a compromise ranking, given the preferences of this electorate of weight vectors.
Well-established in the social choice literature, Kemeny aggregation produces a ranking (referred to as "Kemeny-optimal") that minimizes the sum of pairwise rank disagreements with respect to stated voter preferences. In an important paper, Young and Levenglick [27] validated its intuitive attractiveness by showing that it rests on strong axiomatic foundations. Subsequently, Young [26] showed that Kemeny aggregation provides the maximum likelihood estimate (in the statistical sense of the term) of the true societal ranking of the alternatives. The intuitive, normative, and statistical appeal of Kemeny aggregation make it a very (if not the most) desirable aggregation procedure (Moulin [18] ). The paper's third contribution centers on the computational implementation of the above ideas. This is because, despite its many virtues, Kemeny aggregation suffers from one very serious drawback: the computation of a Kemeny-optimal ranking is NP-hard [6] , even when the number of alternatives is just four [10] . In practical terms this means that we cannot hope to devise a fast algorithm to implement Kemeny aggregation. Thus, to deal with this difficulty, when the Kemeny-optimal ranking cannot be readily identified by first principles, I implement the best-known approximation algorithm available from the theoretical computer science literature to compute a provably-good approximation of it. This algorithm, due to Van Zuylen and Williamson [28] , efficiently produces a compromise ranking whose sum of pairwise disagreements is guaranteed to be no greater than 4/3 times the minimum. 4 To my knowledge, this is the first paper in the economics and social science literature to apply rigorous approximation algorithms in the determination of Kemeny-optimal rankings. I proceed to illustrate the proposed method- 3 This choice is not crucial, and the methods of the paper could extend to alternative parametric structures, albeit at a potentially higher computational cost. 4 Using first principles and a "local Kemenization" procedure discussed in Dwork et al. [10] , I am often able to improve this performance guarantee even further (see Sections 4.3 and 5.2).
ology to two well-known composite indices: the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index [1] , and the United Nations Human Development Index [25] . In both cases, my procedure correctly identifies Kemeny-optimal rankings under varying levels of weight imprecision.
Paper outline. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model and -contamination framework. Section 3 focuses on pairwise comparisons between alternatives and shows how to adapt the results of Lawrence [17] to my setting. Section 4 draws connections with social choice theory and Kemeny aggregation in particular, and presents a procedure for computing a provably-robust ranking given weight imprecision. Section 5 implements the proposed procedure to the Rule of Law and Human Development Indices, while Section 6 provides concluding remarks. All mathematical proofs, tables, and figures are collected in the Appendix.
Model Description
Consider a set of alternatives A indexed by a = 1, 2, ..., A and a set of indicators I indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., I. Let x ai ∈ denote alternative a's value of indicator i, and x a ∈ I its "achievement"
vector collecting all such information (all vectors are taken to be column vectors). The composite score corresponding to alternative a is computed through a weighted average of the components of its achievement vector, x a . For clarity I focus on standard linear aggregation, though the analysis easily extends to the generalized weighted means discussed in Permanyer [22] . 5 The employed vector of weights is given by a vector w belonging in ∆ I−1 = {w ∈ I : w ≥ 0,
Here, w i represents the weight given to indicator i.
Clearly, the choice of weights w is very important in determining composite scores on the basis of which alternatives are ranked. Thus it is important to have a sense of how robust a ranking is with respect to changes in w. Suppose we are given an initial vector of weights w ∈ ∆ I−1 . Now suppose that we are willing to consider weights deviating fromw that belong in the set W (w), where 6
Here, the parameter ∈ [0, 1] measures the imprecision associated with the initial vector of weightsw. If = 0, then we are completely confident in our choice ofw, while if = 1 we assign no special status tow and consider all possible weight vectors equally valid. Originally proposed by Hodges and Lehmann [13] in Bayesian analysis, this way of parameterizing probabilistic imprecision is referred to as -contamination. From a statistical point of view, the parameter 5 Indeed, see Section 5.2 for an application of our model to the geometric aggregation framework of the HDI. 6 To avoid cumbersome notation, from now on I suppress dependence of W (w) onw.
may be interpreted as the amount of error attached to a priorw. 7 The -contamination parametric structure has also been studied in the economics and decision theoretic literature on Knightian uncertainty ( [20, 15] , among many others), which however places more emphasis on the normative foundations and behavioral implications of such belief imprecision.
3 Pairwise comparisons over a continuum of weights Some additional notation would be useful. Let W a 1 a 2 denote the intersection of W with the I-dimensional halfspace w ∈ I : w x a 1 ≥ w x a 2 . Introducing the difference vector
The proportion we are interested in, denoted by V a 1 a 2 , is defined as the ratio of the volumes of polytopes W a 1 a 2 and W (V ol denotes volume):
When d w = 0 and = 0, I set V a 1 a 2 = 1/2. Now, basic geometric reasoning allows us to establish an unambiguous monotonicity property of V a 1 a 2 with respect to the level of imprecision . In addition to its theoretical appeal, this property, summarized in Theorem 1, may be of considerable practical use (see Section 5.1).
There will in general be a discontinuity at = 0. 7 The interested reader may consult Chapter 4 in the survey by Berger [7] for many additional references on -contamination.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, when d w = 0 and a 1 and a 2 do not yield identical composite scores under the initial vector of weightsw, Theorem 1 establishes that the proportion of weights favoring one alternative over another varies monotonically in the imprecision attached tow. The direction of the relationship depends on the comparison of alternatives a 1 and a 2 under weightsw. It is decreasing if a 1 initially dominates a 2 and increasing otherwise. Conversely, when the initial weights yield identical composite scores for a 1 and a 2 , the situation is different. For any two levels of imprecision 1 and 2 above 0, we will have V 1 a 1 a 2 = V 2 a 1 a 2 , while at = 0 we will have (by definition) V 0 a 1 a 2 = 1/2. Thus, V is constant when ∈ (0, 1] and will generally have a discontinuity at 0.
Define the function
and suppose that there exists at least one indicator i * ∈ I such that d i * ≥ D( ). If such an i * does not exist, then we may immediately conclude that V a 1 a 2 = 0 (see proof of Theorem 1).
Without loss of generality (upon possible relabeling) suppose that i * = I and define w * ∈ I−1 and d * ∈ I−1 as the restriction of vectors w and d to variables I\{i * } = {1, 2, .., I − 1} ≡ I * .
Consider the following polytope W , * a 1 a 2 (here e denotes a vector of all ones of dimension I − 1)
Polytope W , * a 1 a 2 is obtained upon performing a sequence of simple affine transformations to polytope W a 1 a 2 , ultimately reducing its dimension by 1 (see the proof of Theorems 1 and 2).
Using basic results from linear algebra (Lang [16] ) we arrive at the following Theorem.
Theorem 2 Consider polytope W
, * a 1 a 2 given by (5) . The quantity V a 1 a 2 defined in Eq. (3) satisfies
In light of Theorem 2, the main challenge now lies in calculating the volume of polytope W , * a 1 a 2 . We make the following assumption. Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, by Proposition 3 we have an efficient method of computing V a 1 a 2 for any two alternatives a 1 and a 2 and ∈ [0, 1]. We conclude by performing the following transformation on V a 1 a 2 for all pairs a 1 , a 2 ∈ A:
This transformation provides a fair tie-breaking rule for vectors of weights yielding identical composite scores. It ensures that the volume of the polytope
is equally divided between alternatives a 1 and a 2 so that V a 1 a 2 can be interpreted as the proportion of weights strictly favoring a 1 over a 2 . Moreover, it implies that
In practice, these adjustments may often turn out to be negligible.
Remark 1. Assumption 1 is not strictly necessary for the implications of Proposition 3 to
hold. As Lawrence himself notes in his paper's conclusion [17] , his method can be extended to non-simple polytopes using standard linear programming techniques (see Bueler et al. [8] for an application). I choose to impose Assumption 1 because it can be always easily satisfied by a slight perturbation ofw or , while simplifying computations significantly.
Example 1. One of the strengths of the proposed framework is that it sheds light on subtle, but important differences among alternatives. This is illustrated by the following example:
Looking at just the ordinal dimension of the indicator data, we see that both a 1 and a 2 dominate in exactly two dimensions. Moreover, the difference in the composite scores under zero imprecision is quite small: 2.5 for a 1 and 2.625 for a 2 . This may lead us to think that the two alternatives are roughly equal, and remain all the more so when we take weight imprecision into account. However, this is not true. Indeed, we see that in reality a 2 fares significantly better than a 1 if we allow for weight imprecision (and our model makes quantitatively precise to what degree this is so), especially if we only wish to consider small levels of :
Example 2. I provide an example of the discontinuity discussed in part (ii) of Theorem 1.
Consider:
These data yield
4 Weight imprecision and social choice theory
Weight vectors as voters
In Section 2 I discussed how an initial vector of weightsw and a value of imply, via the -contamination framework, the set of weights W of Eq. (1). Subsequently, in Section 3 I demonstrated how, given a pair of alternatives a 1 , a 2 ∈ A and a value ∈ [0, 1] we can use
Lawrence's formula [17] to efficiently compute the proportion of weights within W whose composite score for a 1 is at least as high as for a 2 . After performing the transformation (6) for all pairs of alternatives in A, this information can be summarized by a matrix
(whose diagonal entries are set to zero by definition, i.e., V aa = 0 for all a).
Suppose now that we think of a vector of weights w ∈ W as a voter belonging to an electorate W (the greater is, the larger the electorate). With this interpretation in mind, the quantity V a 1 a 2 defines the percentage of voters within the electorate W preferring alternative a 1 to a 2 . Thus, all information on the pairwise preferences of the electorate W over the set of alternatives A is succinctly summarized by the matrix V .
How can we use this information to compare and order alternatives? Given that the entries of matrix V will generally fall strictly between 0 and 1, there will not be a ranking of A that is consistent with the preferences of all weights belonging to W . Thus, the question arises:
In view of this inconclusiveness, what would be a "good" compromise ranking that takes into account the results of pairwise comparisons across the electorate W ? One well-known problem with Condorcet winners is that it is easy to construct examples of the so-called Condorcet paradox (originally noted by the Marquis himself), in which voters' ranked preferences preclude their existence [18] . In such instances, the Condorcet criterion is clearly of no help in choosing between different rankings. To deal with this issue, Kemeny [14] introduced an aggregation procedure satisfying a generalization of the Condorcet criterion, referred to in the literature as Kemeny optimality. Given a set of individual rankings, Kemeny aggregation produces a ranking (referred to as "Kemeny-optimal") that minimizes the sum of its pairwise disagreements with respect to voter preferences. As a corollary, when a Condorcet ranking exists, Kemeny's rule is guaranteed to choose it. 9 In an important article Young and
Kemeny aggregation
Levenglick [27] confirmed the intuitive appeal of Kemeny aggregation by proving that it rests on solid axiomatic foundations. Moreover, Young [26] showed that, from a statistical standpoint, Kemeny aggregation can be viewed as a providing the maximum likelihood estimate of the "true" societal ranking of the alternatives.
The intuitive, normative, and statistical appeal of Kemeny aggregation make it a very desirable voting rule. Indeed, Moulin [18] goes so far as to state that it is the "correct method"
for ranking alternatives. Unfortunately, however, Kemeny aggregation suffers from one very serious drawback: the computation of a Kemeny-optimal ranking is NP-hard [6] , even when the number of alternatives is just four [10] . In practical terms this means that we cannot hope to devise a fast algorithm to implement Kemeny aggregation. Nevertheless, spurred by the applicability of rank aggregation methods for internet search, various fast heuristics have been proposed in the computer science literature (e.g. Dwork et al. [10] ).
In recent years, a burgeoning theoretical computer science literature has emerged that proposes provably-good approximation algorithms for Kemeny aggregation. An intelligent synopsis of these contributions is beyond the scope of this work and the interested reader is encouraged to refer to Section 1 in Van Zuylen and Williamson [28] for more information. For the purposes of this paper, I draw particular attention to the work of Van Zuylen and Williamson [28] . Their algorithm (DerandFASLP-Pivot in Figure 1 of [28] ) employs a polynomial-time recursive procedure to produce a ranking whose sum of pairwise disagreements is within 4/3 of the minimum, the best approximation guarantee currently available. Its running time is primarily constrained by the solution of the linear programming relaxation of Kemeny aggregation. The output rank-9 Indeed, Kemeny-optimal rankings satisfy a stronger version of the Condorcet criterion known as the extended Condorcet criterion [10] .
ing of this algorithm can be potentially improved by applying to it a procedure known as "local Kemenization" (Dwork et al. [10] ). Local Kemenization successively examines all adjacent pairs of alternatives in a ranking and flips them if they result in an improved Kemeny performance.
It may be efficiently implemented in polynomial time and it is guaranteed to produce a unique ranking that satisfies an extended version of the Condorcet criterion [10] .
Application to composite index rankings
I now proceed to apply the above concepts to composite index rankings under weight imprecision. Recall the set of alternatives A. A ranking R is a bijective map from A to {1, 2, ..., A},
where R(a) is interpreted as the rank of alternative a. Let R A denote the set of all rankings of A. The Kendall-τ distance between two rankings R 1 and R 2 , denoted by τ (R 1 , R 2 ), is defined as the number of pairs (a i , a j ) such that
counts the number of (pairwise) relative rank disagreements between R 1 and R 2 . Given a set of rankings S, a ranking K is Kemeny-optimal if it minimizes the function S∈S τ (·, S) over the set of rankings R A . In the usual formulation of the problem, the set S is finite so the above sum is well-defined. However, in our context each weight vector in W corresponds to a different ranking, implying that S is uncountable. Thus, to make sure the Kemeny-optimal ranking is well-defined we normalize by S du and write:
To apply the preceding formula to our context, we need to identify the appropriate set of rankings S, which would entail associating a ranking for every vector of weights belonging to W .
This task is already demanding when the set of voters is finite, let alone when it is uncountable.
Fortunately, however, I am able to sidestep this concern. This is because, to calculate a Kemenyoptimal ranking we only need the results of all pairwise comparisons between elements in A, given by matrix V , which can be efficiently computed using the methods in Section 3. Thus, letting (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A × A denote ordered pairs of alternatives in A, and K the Kemeny optimal ranking given the set of weights W , we may write
Integrating the above discussion with that of Sections 2 and 3, I propose the following procedure to address minimization problem (7) and provide a robust compromise ranking of the alternatives given weight imprecision.
Procedure 1 (Input: x a for all a ∈ A, ,w.) (a) Use the method outlined in Proposition 3 of Section 3 to compute the matrix V . Perform transformation (6) on the elements of V .
(b) Given V , attempt to explicitly find Kemeny-optimal ranking K by first principles. Procedure 1's performance guarantee. When
Step (b) of Procedure 1 cannot be accomplished, it is important to know how close to Kemeny-optimal the output ranking K ZW, will be. To wit, given a ranking R and ∈ [0, 1] define the function
and consider the output ranking produced by the Van Zuylen-Williamson algorithm before local Kemenization, denoted by K ZW, . Its 4/3 performance guarantee implies that
Now, consider the ranking produced by the Van Zuylen-Williamson algorithm after local Kemenization, denoted by K ZW, , and define the constant α ≥ 1 such that
Conversely, by first principles we may immediately establish the following lower bound:
With bound (10) in mind, define the constant β ≥ 1 such that
Putting Eqs. (8)- (9)- (10)- (11) together, we may deduce the following guarantee on the performance of K ZW, :
Thus, we see that, depending on the values of α and β , the 4/3 performance guarantee of Van Zuylen and Williamson can potentially be tightened.
Note. I end this section by noting that the application of Kemeny aggregation to composite indices has been previously pursued by Munda and Nardo [19] . However, their work differs from mine in substantive ways. First, Munda and Nardo simply consider each indicator as a voter, and do not introduce a systematic parametric structure for weight imprecision such as -contamination. Hence, their "electorate" is simply the set of I weight vectors assigning full weight to the different dimensions. As a result, calculating the proportion of voters favoring one alternative over another reduces to simply counting the indicators resulting in a higher value for it and cardinal information on the magnitude of this pairwise dominance is lost. Second, even within this restricted setting, Munda and Nardo present a largely qualitative picture that, beyond mentioning the existence of heuristics, does not propose a method for computing a Kemeny-optimal ranking nor a provably-good approximation for it.
Applications
In For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the 21 European Union countries for which the Rule of Law index has data. Using the notation of Section 4, I denote it by K 0 . Conversely, the last column of Table 1 shows that this same ranking will be Kemeny-optimal for any value of ∈ (0, 1]. This strong conclusion is arrived at solely by focusing on = 1 and inspecting the matrix V 1 in Table 2 .
Doing a simple check on the latter table, we see that there does not exist a pair of countries (a 1 , a 2 ) such that K 0 (a 1 ) < K 0 (a 2 ) and V 1 a 1 a 2 < .5. By Theorem 1 this implies that no such pairs exist for any V where < 1 either. Hence, the original ranking K 0 based on equal weights w will satisfy
where l are the lower bounds defined in Eq. (10) . As a result, we can unequivocally conclude that K 0 will be the unique Kemeny-optimal ranking for all possible levels of imprecision ∈ [0, 1].
2013 United Nations Human Development Index
The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a prominent composite index of development. The HDI focuses on three main dimensions of development: (1) life expectancy, measured at birth (2) education, measured by mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling (3) GNI per capita measured in US dollars by purchasing power parity. Each dimension constitutes its own subindex and the data are normalized to lie between 0 and 1. In its most recent versions, the HDI is the geometric mean of the three dimension scores, where each dimension is assigned equal weight. In light of its importance in international policy circles, testing the robustness of the HDI rankings with respect to changes in weights has been pursued in a number of alternative ways (e.g., Anderson et al. [3] , Foster et al. [12] , Pinar et al. [23] ). I proceed to apply Procedure 1 to the most recent version of the HDI published in 2013. That the HDI is not a linear but a multiplicative composite does not complicate the use of my methodology. Indeed, since achievement vectors are non-negative and the natural logarithm is a strictly increasing function, the following relation holds
which implies that I can safely apply Procedure 1 to a linear composite index utilizing the natural logarithms of the HDI data. Table 3 summarizes 2012 data for the three dimensions of the HDI for the countries having the 20 highest HDI scores under equal weightsw = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (this ranking appears as K 0 in the Table' s fourth column). The last four columns of Table 3 present the rankings obtained by applying Procedure 1 (to the natural logarithm of the data) for ∈ {1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1}.
How close are these rankings to the Kemeny-optimal ones? To answer this question I refer to quantities α and β defined in Eqs. (9)- (11) . Table 4 , in combination with inequality (12) , immediately establishes that Procedure 1 yields a Kemeny-optimal ranking for ∈ {1/4, 1/2, 3/4}. When = 1, the performance guarantee given by bound (12) is slightly above 1 (i.e., min{1.279, 1.001} = 1.001) and I cannot immediately establish the Kemeny optimality of K ZW,1 . Instead, it is necessary to examine the ranking K ZW,1 in more detail. To account for the value of β 1 > 1, I search for pairs of countries a 1 , a 2 simultaneously satisfying V 1 a 1 a 2 < .5 and K ZW,1 (a 1 ) < K ZW,1 (a 2 ). With regard to these pairwise comparisons K ZW,1 goes against the wishes of a majority of weights. We find two such pairs. They are (1) Singapore-France (a 1 = 17, a 2 = 6). Here we have V 1 a 1 a 2 = 0.498 but K ZW,1 (a 1 ) = 17 < K ZW,1 (a 2 ) = 20.
(2) Switzerland-Japan (a 1 = 19, a 2 = 12). Here we have V 1 a 1 a 2 = 0.484 but K ZW,1 (a 1 ) = 8 < K ZW,1 (a 2 ) = 11.
Such issues turn out to be inevitable. This is because we find ourselves in an instance of the Condorcet paradox discussed in Section 4.2. Indeed, the electorate associated with the set of weights W 1 produces what are known as Condorcet cycles [18] , implying that there exists no ordering of the countries that is able to respect majority rule for all pairwise comparisons.
Consulting the matrix V 1 computed in step (a) of Procedure 1 we identify two groups of countries that form such Condorcet cycles:
(1) Singapore-Austria-Belgium-France (a 1 = 17, a 2 = 2, a 3 = 3, a 4 = 6). Here we have Focusing on the above two cycles, we may deduce by inspection that K ZW,1 resolves them in a way that minimizes the total amount of pairwise disagreements. Thus, we conclude that, similarly to our results for ∈ {.25, .50, .75} , K ZW,1 will be Kemeny-optimal. Given that β 1 = 1.001 ≈ 1, this does not come as much of a surprise.
Conclusion
Judgments based on composite indices depend, sometimes critically, on how different dimensions of performance are weighted. As there is frequently no single "right" way to assign such weights, it is important to take this imprecision into account in a systematic way. In this paper I have presented a procedure for determining a provably-robust ranking of the relevant alternatives,
given a well-established parametric structure for weight imprecision. My procedure is based on a combination of results from polyhedral geometry, social choice, and theoretical computer science, and pays special attention to issues of practicality and computational tractability. Its applicability was illustrated through numerical examples based on recent versions of the Rule of Law and Human Development indices.
Interesting future avenues for research would include adding further structure to the basiccontamination framework (e.g., to reflect normative concerns and/or operational constraints), as well as pursuing more complex empirical applications (e.g., the poverty measurement framework of [2] ). Broader connections with decision-theoretic models of Knightian uncertainty could also be explored. 
Basic linear algebra (see Lang [16] ) implies that
Now let us focus on the numerator. Recall the difference vector d = x a 1 − x a 2 and the function
. Performing the same affine transformation as before, namely w ← w−(1− )w , the polytope W a 1 a 2 is transformed into
which in turn implies
Putting Eqs. (13)- (15) together, we obtain
Eqs (4)- (14) 
The affine transformation f which maps polytope W , * a 1 a 2 to W a 1 a 2 is given by f : I−1 → I , satisfying f (w * ) = T · w * + [0, 0, ..., 0, 1] , where T is an I × (I − 1) matrix equal to:
Thus we have det [T · T ] = I. Once again, basic linear algebra [16] implies that
Eqs. (16)- (17) together imply
Proposition 3. We first identify the vertices of polytope W , * a 1 a 2 . In doing so, we divide the set of indicators I * = {1, 2, ..., I − 1} into I * 1 and I * 2 , such that
Assumption 1 ensures that {I * 1 , I * 2 } is a partition of I * . It will be useful to express polytope W , * a 1 a 2 in the following way: With representation (18) in mind, a vector v is a vertex of W , * a 1 a 2 if it satisfies I − 1 linearly independent inequality constraints with equality [5] . The structure of vectors y k for k = 1, 2, ..., I +1 and b imply that a vertex of W , * a 1 a 2 can have at most 2 nonzero entries. Furthermore, Assumption 1 ensures primal nondegeneracy so that every vertex v will corresponds to a unique basis matrix B v , i.e., a unique set of linearly independent constraints satisfied with equality.
We may distinguish between four kinds of vertices and their corresponding bases:
, for all j ∈ I * 2 . Here B j = {y k : k = 1, ..., j − 1, j + 1, .., I − 1, I + 1}, for all j ∈ I * 2 .
(V4) v ij = π ij e i + (1 − π ij )e j , where
, for all i ∈ I * 1 and j ∈ I * 2 . Here B ij = {y k : k = 1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, .., j − 1, j + 1, ..., I, I + 1}, for all i ∈ I * 1 and j ∈ I * 2 . Table 1 3  2  2  2  2   Table 3 : 2013 HD Report data (recall that Procedure 1 will be applied to natural logarithms of these data) and rankings. For = 1, the * and • signs identify the pairs of countries that eventually lead to Condorcet cycles. .50 1.002 1.000
A2: Tables and Figures
.75 1.011 1.000 1 1.028 1.001 Table 4 : Performance guarantee of Procedure 1 for rankings shown in Table 3 .
